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The Poet as Fate: Schopenhauer's Literary Vision

The Poet as Fate: Schopenhauer's Literary Vision
The claim that a thinker concerned with the development of a totalizing metaphysical system can be a literary philosopher may seem hard to justify. For Arthur Schopenhauer, the entire world is the representation or appearance of the will to life, the metaphysical essence of all being. And yet, because this will must always appear and always take form, it is only formally that we can grasp it, only in concrete instances. For this reason, the poet "shows us how the will behaves under the influence of motives and reflection. He presents us this for the most part in the most perfect of its appearances" (*WWRII*, 310). In this paper, I will argue that Schopenhauer founds a philosophical approach which comes to rest on literary foundations and which alights at key moments on the strength of his literary as well as his philosophical forebears. I will do this by means of looking at how Schopenhauer treats the concept of fate. It is my contention that the fatalism inherent in Schopenhauer's ethics is a direct result of a fundamentally literary approach to the concept. This enables us to conceive of fate from a literary and not solely from a metaphysical standpoint. I will begin by outlining the place of the literary in Schopenhauer's philosophy, including a brief account of those writers whose work he incorporates into his analysis, and then I will demonstrate its relation to his fatalism.

Keywords: Schopenhauer, fate, will, narrative, poetry, phenomena, thing-in-itself, Goethe, Byron, Shakespeare

> "The dramatic or epic poet should know that *he* is fate, and hence, like fate, be inexorable" (*WWRII*, 453).[1]

[1] Schopenhauer (2018: II 453). Subsequent textual references are to this edition and will be designated by the abbreviation '*WWRII*'.

There is certainly no scarcity of treatments of Schopenhauer's influence on nineteenth and twentieth century letters. Most notable, of course, is Schopenhauer's contributions to the structural and philosophical elements of Wagner's operas, and his providing the framework within which and against which Friedrich Nietzsche was to develop his own philosophy.[2] It is beyond his own century that Schopenhauer's philosophy was really extended to world literature. Thomas Hardy, Joseph Conrad, Jorge Luis Borges, Marcel Proust and Samuel Beckett are just some of those who have either acknowledged their debt to Schopenhauer or who have had it acknowledged for them by scholars.[3] In the French language, Schopenhauer had an influence on decadent and symbolist writing, notably through Joris-Karl Huysmans, who used elements of Schopenhauer's thought in his « À rebours » (1884).[4] Similarly, Maurice Maeterlinck's interest in the fatalistic elements of his philosophy is well-known.[5] In German literature, his influence is, of course, vast. To name but two examples: Thomas Mann famously wrote the introduction to a book on Schopenhauer in 1938, while Kelly Coble has explored the debt which Robert Musil owes to Schopenhauer in his „Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften".[6] From all of this, we can see how accommodating Schopenhauer's ideas were for the intense productivity of *fin de siècle* writing, particularly in its pessimistic moods.

This is a well worn topic. What is less explored, however, is the reason why there was such an intense literary interest in Schopenhauer's ideas; why, in other words, Schopenhauer's aesthetics lend themselves so well to literary concerns. There are three reasons why writers may have been attracted to Schopenhauer's work. One is that it is overtly contemptuous of professorial philosophy, meaning that there is no institutional loyalty nor any academic coterie surrounding the ideas in it; though a professional philosopher, Schopenhauer's temperament is amateur. Second, his philosophy is more accessible than most idealist works. His style is clear and poetic, rather than dry and verbose. Third, and this is the reason that I will explore below, there is something intensely literary about his philosophy: for his concepts, he relies as much on an interest in aesthetic practice as he does on theory. Literariness is imbedded into the work itself. This might

[2] The contentious relationship that Wagner and Nietzsche both had towards Schopenhauer's work (and to each other) is covered in a recent essay by Robert Cowan, in which he covers the extent to which Wagner was influenced by the philosopher. See Cowan (2014).

[3] See, for example: Hardy (1985), Knowles (1994: esp. 77-83,) Ray (2008), Li (2016), Beckett (1931), Acheson (1978: esp. 169).

[4] West (1971: 313).

[5] Johach (2008). Johach demonstrates the extent to which Schopenhauer influenced Maeterlinck's writing in the natural sciences, rather than his plays. Maesterlinck's fatalistic marionette plays, however, clearly demonstrate Schoperhauerian ideas and images.

[6] See Mann (1938), Coble (2006).

explain why his influence was greater in the arts than it was in aesthetic theory. One sees this in particular in his conception of fate, which is best understood as the form which the will to life takes in its phenomenal manifestations. Fate plays a key role in Schopenhauer's work, and he most often describes the individual life's relation to it in terms of a character in a tragedy, or a figure in an epic poem. It may be objected, of course, that these are simply privileged metaphors, demonstrations of the breadth of Schopenhauer's learning. While that may also be true, if we look closely at Schopenhauer's use of the literary, we see that he does not use it as embellishment for his philosophy, but rather as evidence, as cornerstone, and as embodiment for all of his ideas. His work is thus irreducibly aesthetic and therein lies the attraction for artists and writers.

At the heart of his philosophy is a fatalistic ethics, one which is based on the recognition that we are mere appearances, or forms, of the will. As appearance or representation of the will, we are not free to determine what happens in our lives. The will is free to determine us. In his discussions of the freedom of the will, Schopenhauer has recourse to the notion that human life, indeed all life, is governed by the interrelations of causes and effects, such that in retrospect we are like characters in a drama, one which always turns out to be a tragedy, as our only way out of emotional suffering is the renunciation of all willing. On the surface, this is a powerful illustration, a privileged metaphor, which Schopenhauer uses to give a concrete form to the deterministic structure of the universe. On closer inspection, however, we see that the very structure of Schopenhauer's universe relies on the form of his metaphor, to such an extent that it is a literary conception of fate, and not the scientific notion of causality, that operates in his ethics.

Schopenhauer's Theory of the Will and Representation

Before we come to the literary aspects of Schopenhauer's thought, however, it is worth recounting the central tenets of his philosophy in order to see where the literary fits into it. "The world is my representation" (*WWRI*, 23).[7] This famous line, which opens "The World as Will and Representation" (1819) contains, Schopenhauer claims, the entirety of his philosophy. It is perhaps more useful, however, to begin deeper in Schopenhauer's project with the other pillar of his metaphysics: will. According to his theory, the world and everything in it are representations (or manifestations) of the Will-to-Life (hereafter, "will"),

[7] Schopenhauer (2014: I). Subsequent textual references are to this edition and will be designated by the abbreviation "*WWRI*".

the single ground of all existence, a striving for existence itself which is embodied in all being. All life on earth, for example, is a manifestation of this will, and all things are held together by their shared participation in the act of willing: "all the parts and aspects of the world agree with each other because they belong to a single whole" (*WWRI*, 109), Schopenhauer writes, and this whole is the will. Kant's separation of appearances (phenomena) and things-in-themselves (noumena) is maintained by Schopenhauer but the distinction undergoes a transformation. There is only the noumenon of the will to life. Thus, although we are used to speaking of "my will" or "your will", as if these were emotions that came from our own individuality, we can only really speak of one grand act of willing, over which we have no control. We merely represent it.

What is this will? It is perhaps best conceived as the foundation of all being, and the reason for all existence. In his "Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will", Schopenhauer argues that everything in the world exists by virtue of the law of cause and effect with the one exception of the will, which is the ground of being (and thus has no cause). As the essence of all life itself, including our own, the will is wholly at liberty in that it is beyond the laws of cause and effect. When it takes form, however, be it as a mountain or as a poet, it does so in a pattern, and this pattern we call the laws of physics, governed above all by the law of causation. This law of causation is the form of the will. As beings, we are determinations of the will and are, therefore, subject to the law of causation. This he calls the "principle of sufficient reason", also following Kant. This principle is the nature of the appearance of the will and means, in essence, that everything in existence must have a cause: although the will is free in and of itself, its appearance in the world is deterministic, as it has the structure of a long, and for us inescapable, chain of cause and effect.

For Schopenhauer, life is willing. The will cannot be grasped as such, primarily because our categories of thought are bound up with the law of causation: we can only observe the world of representation. We can only understand the will by means of certain metaphors, of which fate is one of the primary cases. We may trace back any event, any phenomenon, to an ultimate cause, but the will itself cannot be traced back at all, since it is the sole transcendent force, the Absolute (to use a term from Schopenhauer's rival, Hegel), indeed, since it is everything. It is only by renouncing our claims to selfhood that we can be free. As individuals, we are wholly determined; only as part of the will itself can we be free.

> That the will as such is *free* follows from our view that it is the thing in itself, the content of all appearance. But…everything that belongs to appearance, i. e. is an object for the subject of cognition as an individual, is on the one hand a ground, on the other hand a consequent, and in this last capacity is thoroughly and necessarily determined, which is to say: there is no sense in which it can be other than it is. The whole content of nature, all of its appearances, is thus thoroughly necessary, and the necessity of each part, each appearance, each event, can in every case be

> demonstrated, since there must be a ground on which it depends as a consequent (*WWRI*, 313).

But we should not ascribe to the will a certain consciousness or intention. The universe is, for Schopenhauer, wholly irrational. "The will", he writes, "is striving without aim and without end" (*WWRI*, 347). The ultimate content of all existence, then, is a meaningless striving for existence itself; all plants, all animal life, all of humanity, is nothing more than an appearance or representation whose entire meaning is derived from an ultimately meaningless will. What matters for his philosophy is the recognition of this will. The task of the philosopher is to engage in grasping that the truth of the universe is in a wholeness as grounded only in a meaningless, directionless striving. All that there is, all that we are, is a representation of a force for existence itself. This force, this will, is the only true freedom and, as representations of it, this freedom is inaccessible to us: we are compelled by the will's free and directionless striving.

This insight is at the heart of Schopenhauer's famous pessimism. From the smallest stone to the most libertine poet, from each atom in the universe, we are chained to the directionless striving of the will. Our conception of our freedom, whether it be freedom of movement or freedom of conscience, is, for Schopenhauer, an illusion. Although we are far more complex organisms than stones, we are no less constrained by the will than they are. Schopenhauer's vision of humanity is, then, one in which:

> every individual, every human face and its life history is just one more short dream of the infinite spirit of nature, the persistent will to life; it is just one more fleeting image jotted playfully on its infinite page, space and time, and is allowed an infinitesimal existence (compared with these), before it is erased to free up room. (*WWRI*, 348)

But even here there is a caveat from Schopenhauer's side. Whether it be consolation or curse, humanity does stand in a privileged relationship to the will. While we share with animals consciousness and instinct, in our capacity for rational speculation, we are able to grasp the nature of the universe, to comprehend the spirit of nature, and to recognise ourselves as mere appearance of the will. By recognising ourselves as appearance (which is to say, as form), we are better able to understand the nature of life itself, supposedly the goal of poetry, metaphysics and natural science.

But what are we meant to do with the realisation that we are nothing but appearance of the will to life? Schopenhauer claims that all suffering in the world is due to the painful processes though which the will to life relentlessly pursues the continuance of its own existence. The strains of life, the pain, decay, sorrow that we feel is really just the force of the will in us, and when we die, this force will continue in other people, in other things. Is there a way out of this? Schopenhauer says that there is and it lies in our ability to resign our willing: to give up wanting things, striving after things, having ambitions for ourselves

and to instead transcend these emotions by watching life pass by as a dream; we may not be able to choose what we will, but we can resign from willing altogether. Instead of trying to preserve ourselves at all costs, we can achieve a state analogous to the *nirvana* of Buddhism, where we see ourselves at one with the universe, dissolving our egoism into a universal state.

Schopenhauer was always at great pains to distance his theories from those of fatalism and it is instructive to look at the final paragraph of the second volume of the "World as Will and Representation", which concludes the entire thesis. Here Schopenhauer repudiates "that doctrine that refers the existence of the world, along with the critical condition of the human race within the world, back to some absolute necessity". However, he also rejects those opponents of such fatalism who "deduc[e] the world from the free act of will of a being located outside the world". What he claims to offer is a "third way": "the act of will from which the world arises is our own" (*WWRII*, 662-663). The will, which we are, is free because it is in essence liberated from the principle of sufficient reason. There are reasons, however, to be suspicious of Schopenhauer's attempt to distance himself from fatalism: when considered from the perspective of the individual in their concrete existence and not from the perspective of the will in general, we become caught in a fatalistic universe. The will does, indeed, appear to us as both an absolute necessity, seeing as everything that happened in our lives was determined from beyond, and as something outside the world, in that we might recognise a distinction between appearance and reality.

Yet it is still not clear what this has to do with literature specifically. As it stands, the notion of a causality of appearances directed by a blind, aimless will to life sounds like a matter for the natural sciences on the one hand, and metaphysics on the other: how they are unified and what role the human sciences and art can play remains unclear. The answer lies in the way in which human beings frame their understanding of the will to life and its appearances. While we may follow Schopenhauer in agreeing that there is a monist will to life, and that this will is free of the causality of sufficient reason, and that everything that we are and that has happened to us in our lives was a result of this aimless will, we may still object that it does not appear so to us. Indeed, Schopenhauer builds this into his argument. Following Kant, he argues that the moral and aesthetic locus of the will is the individual subject. Indeed, although we may grasp the objective, noumenal nature of the will conceptually and abstractly, we experience it wholly subjectively and concretely: we experience it not as the will to life but as our will, or as the will of others, or as an external force that works on us, that causes us to suffer or that grants us favours. The root of our existence may be a directionless metaphysical will but the appearance of our lives is structured, temporal, and therefore graspable as a sequence of events, all of which appear dictated from without by what Schopenhauer calls "external necessity" (by the will as nature)

and within as what he refers to as "internal necessity" (by the will as character). These two forces are, in essence, one and the same. These necessities we recognise as the forces governing our lives, and, when we reflect on them, we see a sequence or pattern. This is where the literary, and specifically dramatic, nature of Schopenhauer's thought comes to the fore: this pattern, grasped at the level of the individual subject experiencing life, is transformed into a narrative, and the will to life is equally transformed into its literary equivalent, fate. This conceptual movement is one that Schopenhauer makes repeatedly across his work, though here we will focus on "The World as Will and Representation" and a later essay entitled "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual" (1851).[8] What appears to the abstracting metaphysician as will to life appears to the concrete individual as fate. This is what Schopenhauer draws out from his aesthetic reading of literary works and, furthermore, constitutes the literary pillar of his own thought (alongside metaphysics and the natural sciences). One may object that this remains in the realm of metaphor, and that Schopenhauer is using the language of literature to embellish what is, effectively, a purely philosophical account, but such a judgement would disregard Schopenhauer's attempt to unify his aesthetic and metaphysical writing. More significantly, it would ignore the intense formalism with which Schopenhauer approaches existence itself, and that this formalism is intensified by his literary sensibilities. We can now turn to Schopenhauer's use of literature.

Schopenhauer and Literature

The most significant literary relationship both in Schopenhauer's thought and his personal life is that of Goethe. He was acquainted with Goethe through his mother, Johanna Schopenhauer, who had become a part of Weimar's literary scene. Goethe appears to have been initially somewhat reserved towards the younger man, who was, conversely "awestruck" by the famous writer, as David E. Cartwright writes in his biography.[9] Goethe eventually saw in Schopenhauer

[8] One might object that Schopenhauer's famous "Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will" is not included here. The reason for this is that in this essay, he outlines in great detail the ways in which the will itself is free but that we, as manifestations of the will, are not free in and of ourselves. We are only free because we are part of the aimless willing. This is also, however, the least literary of his works. It is notable that when he conducts the same discussion in "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual", the focus on the idea of fate compels him to couch his discussion in literary terms. It is for this reason that I have focussed on the latter.

[9] Cartwright (2003: 239).

a potential ally in his work on the theory of colours, though he seems to have misunderstood aspects of Schopenhauer's philosophical beliefs.[10] Schopenhauer eventually argued against Goethe's perspective. Schopenhauer remained in contact with Goethe through his academic career, and even sent him a copy of his doctoral thesis, "The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason", which he completed at the University of Jena. The remarkable extent to which Goethe influenced Schopenhauer (and vice versa) and the formative role played by their collaboration on colour theory has been recently explored by Adrian Del Caro. As Del Caro points out, Goethe is a striking example of how "Schopenhauer seems to use his literary sources as allies to validate his own positions, but he also uses them more authentically to provide examples of specific points he is trying to make".[11] Del Caro concludes his extraordinarily detailed account of Goethe's and Schopenhauer's "tumultuous intellectual relationship" by noting their shared commitment to science – it is worth, for the purposes of this study, however, stressing their shared commitment to the other pole of their relationship: literariness.[12]

Goethe is, like Plato and Kant, a pervasive figure in "The World as Will and Representation". He stands over the work as a cultural authority: Schopenhauer cites him for his theory of colour, his observations on biological processes, his philosophical depth, and, of course, for his writing (and not insignificantly, name-dropping: "*Goethe* once said to me that when he read a page of *Kant* he felt as though he had entered a bright room", *WWRII*, 153). More significantly, one can see Goethe's influence in the nature of Schopenhauer's arguments, and in his imagery. He claimed that "Goethe's *Elective Affinities* is based on the idea (although perhaps unbeknownst to Goethe) that the will, the ground of our own essence, is the same thing that announces itself in the lowest inorganic appearances" (*WWRII*, 309). This is not the place to comment on the persuasiveness of Schopenhauer's claim, but one might consider the following passage from "The Sorrows of Young Werther" (1774) in the light of Schopenhauer's arguments made 40 years after its publication:

> That the life of man be just a dream has already struck some and this idea pulls at me, too. If I consider the limits within which man's actions and inquiries are constrained; when I see how all our energies are dedicated to procuring the satisfaction of requirements, which themselves have no purpose other than extending our wretched existence, and then that all our reassurance regarding certain points of investigation is nothing more than dreamlike resignation, while one paints the walls between which one is trapped with colourful figures and bright landscapes – all of this astounds me, Wilhelm. I turn back within myself and find there a world!

[10] See, for example, Cartwright (2003: 258).

[11] Del Caro (2020: 20).

[12] Del Caro (2020: 23).

> But more in notion and dark desires than in presentation and living power. And there everything swims before my senses, and I continue smiling so dreamily in the world.[13]

What Werther, the young aesthete, outlines as an attitude or a mood, is a notion which Schopenhauer would transform into a philosophical creed. This is, at root, an aesthetic vision, and one which is anchored in a narrative sense. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of a narrative which causes young Werther difficulty; similarly, Schopenhauer seems to root much of humanity's problems in the fact that the will to life has no clear teleological goal, other than willing itself. The question of resignation of meaning before a blind necessity, and the choosing of viewing life as presentation (*Darstellung*) as a way out of the "wretched[ness]" of existence are all hallmarks of Schopenhauer's argument, and they are all present in Werther's vision here.

In terms of the formal elements of his philosophical vision, it is tragedy that takes the central role. He describes tragedy as "the pinnacle of literature", drawing its dramatic power from "the conflict of the will with itself", visible in human suffering, brought about partly through "chance and error, which step forward as rulers of the world and through their treachery …are personified as fate" (*WWRI*, 279-280). He follows the commonplace division of ancient and modern tragedy, focussing most often on the ancient Greeks and the work of French, English, German, and Spanish writers in the modern era. In terms of the ancients, Sophocles is hailed as having found the "true model" of how "blind fate" can be produced on the stage (*WWRI*, 281), while Euripides is cited for his vision of "eternal justice" (*WWRI*, 281) and his notion of the grandeur of suffering (*WWRII*, 454). Schopenhauer expresses his preference for the moderns over the ancients however, as "the ancients had not yet achieved the pinnacle and aim of tragedy" which lies not in the hero's acquiescing into an adverse fate but rather in what he terms the "renunciation" of Christianity. This is the abandonment of the will to life itself: a resignation from willing, not a submission to it. This he finds in Calderon and Shakespeare. In the case of the former, Schopenhauer was particularly attracted to the tragic vision of his "Life is a Dream" (1636), which he recognised as a metaphysical drama offering a precursor to his own philosophy (*WWRI*, 39). He interpreted this work as a "prophetic" expression of the doctrine of original sin (*WWRI*, 381). The use of Shakespeare is more prolific, appearing across "The World as Will and Representation" in key moments. Schopenhauer sees Shakespeare as being, with Goethe, the pinnacle of genius, and often sources his arguments about humanity, society, and metaphysics in the examples of his plays. The affinity between what Schopenhauer saw as

[13] Goethe (1994: 15). Translation my own.

Shakespeare's tragic vision and his own can be demonstrated by the following quotation from "Henry IV", Part I, which Schopenhauer revealingly quoted in English in the second volume:

> O heaven! That one might read the book of fate,
> And see the revolution of the times,
> … how chances mock,
> And changes fill the cup of alteration
> With divers liquors! O, if this were seen,
> The happiest youth, – viewing his progress through,
> What perils past, what cross to ensue, –
> Would shut the book, and sit him down to die.[14]

This lament contains the kernels of Schopenhauer's own observations and, as we shall see, the image of life as a "book of fate" is one that he would himself employ a number of times in his "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual". Indeed, Schopenhauer preserves a reference to "Hamlet" in his clarification of what art means to his philosophy: "If the whole world exists as representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility … the play within a play, *Hamlet's* stage upon the stage" (*WWRI*, 295).[15] The seamless transition between metaphysical argument and literary citation suggests a dynamism which gives literariness prominence. It is not that Schopenhauer sees in Shakespeare privileged examples of his own metaphysical system, but rather than Shakespeare illustrates the system at work in the very plays themselves. The modern tragedy thus becomes the height of Schopenhauer's tragic vision of life, and it is precisely in thinking through "Hamlet", "Life is a Dream", or "Faust" that such a vision is possible. Schopenhauer, in other words, derives his philosophy in part from canonical literary works.

There is little surprising in Schopenhauer's literary tastes. They revolve around works that fit well into Romantic as well as classical conceptions of the literary canon: Homer, Sophocles, Horace, Dante, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Goethe all make up a significant portion of his bibliography. In terms of his contemporaries, Schopenhauer clearly felt an affinity towards Byron.[16] This

[14] William Shakespeare, "Henry IV", Part 2 in Shakespeare (2008: 1321) (Act 3, Scene I).

[15] "Hamlet's" importance to Schopenhauer is also attested by his use of his famous soliloquy in Act III, Scene 1 as an argument against suicide. Schopenhauer sees Hamlet as expressing an argument for non-being over being restrained by a notion that death may not be the end. This is, in essence, Schopenhauer's own argument (*WWRI*, 350-351).

[16] This is evidenced by the fact that Schopenhauer quotes from several different works by Byron: "Child Harolde", "Don Juan", "The Prophecy of Dante", "Lara", "Euthanasia", and "Cain"; he also uses him a number of times as an example of the workings of genius. See Section 36 of Volume 1, and Chapter 31 of Volume 2 (in the latter case, the weight of Byron's brain is used to indicate his genius).

is not surprising, given Byron's fame in the early nineteenth century and, like many in the period, he tempers his admiration by ranking him "second-rate" in comparison to the list above.[17] Byron does, however, play an important role in "The World as Will and Representation". He provides many of the illustrations of the argument. Schopenhauer's citation of Byron is typical of his use of poets: he sees their work as an embodiment of a certain way of thinking about the world. His use of literature is, in many ways, revelatory; he uses it as evidence that the truth of his argument has always been apparent to the sensitive and the genius; proof that close attention to the aesthetic way of life, as all great writers must demonstrate, reveals the tragedy of the will and the meaninglessness of our existence. One example should suffice. Byron is, for Schopenhauer, an example *par excellence* of the "lyrical state" of young poets, a tendency in which the poet "forms an image of the interior of humanity as a whole". The poet becomes "the mirror of humanity and brings what it feels and does to its own consciousness" (*WWRI*, 276). In such poetry, "willing…and pure intuiting of the surroundings presented, are wonderfully imbricated with each other" (277). In time, reason and sensation grow apart, but Schopenhauer sees in Byron an example of how "in young men, perceptions always strike sensation and mood first, and are in fact mingled with them", and cites the following lines from the third canto of "Childe Harold's Pilgrimage":

> I live not in myself, but I become
> Portion of that around me; and to me
> High mountains are a feeling.[18]

There is in this sentiment the embodiment of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and it is a philosophy which he draws out of reading poetry: Schopenhauer sees in the lyrical use of language the affinity and continuity of being between the poet and the mountains, and a potential redemption from the commonplace illusions with which ordinary speech furnishes us. For Schopenhauer, experiencing the mountains as a feeling is not a metaphoric use of language but a profound insight into the nature of the will: both we and the mountains are manifestations of the will to life, and so it is only natural that we should feel a continuity of emotion with our environment: we share in its essence. Although he does not rank Byron alongside Shakespeare and Goethe (though he does rank him with Rousseau), he still sees in his poetry a particular way of thinking about existence that chimes with his own, and the lyrical impulses behind it are not incidental to this thinking but constitutive of it.

[17] This is, Schopenhauer claims, because Byron transforms protagonists into himself, as opposed to the variety of character achieved in the works of Goethe and of Shakespeare (*WW2*, 450).

[18] Byron (1816: 41). It was presumably this edition to which Schopenhauer referred, given that he quotes from the original, as is his practice with English texts.

Literature and the Expression of Sorrow

We have seen that Schopenhauer was keen to incorporate literary modes of thinking into his work, but we need to go further in order to see the fundamental literariness of his thought itself. With this in mind, we need to explore a level of existence in Schopenhauer's thought that we have not yet covered: ideas. Just as Schopenhauer is keen to maintain Kant's distinction between things as appearances and things-in-themselves, he is equally determined to retain Plato's ideal Forms. For Plato, the Forms were pure abstractions of things, the perfect exemplars of everything from justice to tables. These were accessible only to the philosopher who had ascended above the earthly to a realm of pure thought, and thus these forms are conceivable as abstract ideas. All tables are, for example, mere representations of the true, ideal form of The Table – this is the very idea of the table, accessible only to the philosopher who has transcended the world of appearance. As Plato famously claims, the mimetic element of art, for example a painting of a table, is thus at a two-step remove from the form, and is thus a copy of a copy, inferior not only to actual tables, but to the idea of The Table. Art is, for Plato, a mimetic process unable to capture the true essence of things. Schopenhauer, however, disagrees. For him, artworks are direct apprehensions of the Ideas themselves.

Contrary to Plato, then, art is not at a remove from the truth of the world of ideas, but is in fact a way for us to directly perceive the workings of ideal forms themselves. This is, for Schopenhauer, the universal value of art, derived as it is from universals.

> Art repeats the eternal Ideas grasped through pure contemplation, it repeats what is essential and enduring in all the appearances of the world, and, depending on the medium in which it repeats the Ideas, it takes the form of either the visual arts, poetry, or music; art originates in the cognition of the Ideas alone; and its only goal is the communication of this cognition' (*WWRI*, 207-208)

It is important to remember that for Schopenhauer an idea is not an abstract concept, but rather should be conceived as a kind of concrete vision presented to the mind. The "form" of Plato's work is not a vague concept but a concrete universal. As art is derived from universal forms, rather than the particular workings of appearances, what we glance in poetry, music, and the visual arts is not phenomena but the noumenon: in other words, we perceive the workings of the directionless, originary will itself. This leads Schopenhauer to the following conclusion: Art is "*the way of regarding things independently from the principle of sufficient reason*" (*WWRI*, 208. Italics in text). With art, we look on life as form, as manifestation, and not as willing. Art ameliorates the material of life

from the principle of sufficient reason; it takes a vision out of the waste and decay of time: "a thing of beauty is a joy forever", as Keats writes in *Endymion.*[19] The principle of sufficient reason is the governing principle of all phenomenal existence, and thus Schopenhauer gives art an exalted status as the means by which we can understand our place in the universe. Art liberates us from the workings of causality, the source of our suffering in time-bound existence, by raising our viewpoint up to the presentation of eternal, universal forms.

It is through poetry, and not just through philosophy, then, that we can transcend the world of appearance. The grasping of these universal forms, of the objectification of the will in and of itself, is reliant on the Romantic concept of genius that undoubtedly came to Schopenhauer through his acquaintance with Goethe and his reading in the Romantic poets. Genius is, according to the definition Schopenhauer provides, an intensity of perception of things in themselves, and the relation of appearance to ultimate reality. Contrary to a philosophical analytic intelligence, however, artistic genius is a kind of intuition:

> Genius is the capacity to maintain oneself in a purely intuitive state, to lose oneself in intuition and to withdraw cognition that originally only existed in its service to the will from this service, i. e. temporarily to put one's interests, willing and purposes entirely out of mind, and consequently, fully to relinquish one's personality in order to remain as the *pure cognitive subject*, the clear eye of the world; and this not just momentarily, but for as long and with as much clarity of mind as is necessary to repeat what has been grasped in the form of well-considered art and "what floats in wavering appearance to fasten down in enduring thoughts". (*WWRI*, 209)

One is reminded here of Keats's notion of negative capability, or the ability for the artist to suspend philosophical speculation and exist in a state of pure doubt and an intensity of perception. The relation to beauty lies in the artist's a priori capacity to see through, as it were, the world of appearances. As Schopenhauer writes, this sense of truth and beauty "enables him to look at particular things and recognise the *Idea*, as if he *understands nature's half-spoken words*, and then clearly enunciates what nature only stutters" – (*WWRI*, 248). The artist draws the will out of the world of representation. Acts of genius, then, whether they be the conception of an artwork or the reader/viewer perceiving the work, involve the suspension of cognitive acts from willing, the suspension of individual desires, drives, motivations, intentions, in favour of entering into a state of pure intuition. This is the way in which one turns away from being an objectification of the will by relinquishing the act of willing in favour of stopping to contemplate the will itself.

[19] Keats (2008: 60).

Despite stressing the equality of the various different art forms, and writing movingly on the superiority of music, Schopenhauer effectively assigns literature an exalted place. The reason for this is that literature is, by virtue of its use of progressions and shifts in time, best able to capture the ways in which the will is objectified in appearance. As he writes, "human beings are the principle concern of poetry to the extent that they do not express themselves merely through their figure and face, but through a chain of actions and the thoughts and affects that accompany these actions" (*WWRI*, 270).[20] In tragic writing, this "chain" is embodied in the figure of fate. It is this quality of narrative movement that distinguishes the literary from the visual and plastic arts. In the interaction between idea, character, and simulation of the principles of sufficient reason, it appears that literature is comprised of the greatest range of objectifications of the will. While this covers the formal aspects of poetry, Schopenhauer is also convinced that, in terms of content, "poets …grasp the Idea, the essence of humanity, outside of all relations, outside of time" (*WWRI*, 271). And yet they do this through presenting and reflecting the working of necessity. The reason for this is that "the great subject-matter of poetry is thus the revelation of the Idea that is the highest level of the will's objecthood, the presentation of human beings in the interconnected series of their actions and endeavours" (*WWRI*, 270-271). This "interconnected series" accounts, through the aesthetic use of narrative movement, for the ethical dimension of poetry: its expression of human sorrow, of suffering, of human qualities, of the human condition in its relation to nature, society, existence, and even the will itself.

While much is written about Schopenhauer's resignation, about his turning away from willing, there is another aspect of his thought that is relevant here, which is when we turn back from the contemplation of art to the world of suffering. It is here that a tragic sense of life is truly cultivated. In art we learn to think in tragic categories and, in turning back to the world of appearances, we can then apply them to our own existence. Here the distinction between art and life collapses. For the artist, life provides him with material (a material which, Schopenhauer believes, he then elevates): "worldly events will not be meaningful in and of themselves, but only to the extent that they are characters in which the Idea of humanity can be read" (*WWRI*, 205). It is through artistic, and above all subliminal, sensibilities that we are able to impute meaning to world events, and the events of our own lives. As Schopenhauer writes, "if the whole world

[20] One should perhaps substitute "narrative arts" for "poetry" here. What Schopenhauer means by the term "poetry" is its rather ancient definition: epic, tragedy, comedy. The definition would today be extended to include novels and film; whether lyric poetry, particularly in its modern forms, should be included is unclear. Schopenhauer most often quotes from dramatists, or poets such as Byron, who made extensive use of long narrative forms.

as representation is only the visibility of the will, then art is the clarification of this visibility". Art is thus "the *camera obscura* that shows objects with greater purity and allows them to be surveyed and summarized more readily, the play within a play, "Hamlet's" stage upon the stage" (*WWRI*, 295). Here Schopenhauer gives to art (for its own sake) a philosophical and moral force as such.

It is in tragedy that this clarification reaches its greatest heights, largely because, according to Schopenhauer's pessimistic, fatalistic vision of life, tragedy is the highest expression of the human condition. He outlines three forms of tragedy: extraordinary evil (examples of which he says can be found in Shakespeare's "Richard III", "Othello", "The Merchant of Venice", Schiller's „Die Räuber", Euripides "Hippolytus", and Sophocles's "Antigone"), or through the workings of "blind fate" (Sophocles's "Oedipus Rex" and his "Women of Trachis", Shakespeare's "Romeo and Juliet", Voltaire's « Tancred », and Schiller's „Die Braut von Messina") or, finally, through "people's positioning with respect to each other, through their relationships" (Goethe's „Clavigo", Shakespeare's "Hamlet", and Schiller's „Wallenstein" are apparently all examples of this type of tragedy - *WWRI*, 281-282). For the present study, the second of these is, of course, the most relevant. Indeed, Schopenhauer coalesces his various points relating to tragedy around a treatment of its famous relation to fate, present as this notion is in all forms of tragedy.

> And if in both the other categories of tragedy we catch sight of an appalling fate and horrific evil as powers that are indeed terrible but that threaten us only from a great distance so that we ourselves will probably escape them without being driven to renunciation, - then this last genre shows us the sort of powers that destroy life and happiness and that can at any moment make their way towards us as well, where the greatest suffering is brought about by the entanglements essentially the same as those assumed by our own fate, and through actions that we too might perhaps be capable of committing, so that we may not complain of injustice: then we shudder as we feel ourselves already in the middle of hell (*WWRI*, 282)

Here Schopenhauer reworks Aristotle's notion of catharsis. In witnessing tragedy we do not expel our own fears by watching others suffer, nor do we, through an act of empathy, feel with or for people, but rather we witness our own condition being performed. Catharsis is thus, for Schopenhauer, not a release of emotion but a deepening of it: tragedy allows us to reach into the tragic roots of our existence and recognise there life as will. The tragic circumstances of a play's hero may be different from our own in form but they are not different in content. The reason for this is that the ultimate cause of suffering, the fate of the protagonist, is no different from the cause of our own suffering: the will to life itself. In essence, we all share the same fate, because we are all enclosed inescapably in the world of the will's manifestation.

Schopenhauer has, then, a fundamentally tragic conception of life, and life is tragic precisely in that it is best captured in that literary genre. This is all a

matter of perspective, of course. For man himself, regarding his own fate, life appears tragic, riven as it is with pain and suffering; from the perspective of the will to life, however, the individual complaints of mankind appear ridiculous. As Schopenhauer writes, "the life of every individual is in fact always a tragedy, but worked through in detail, it has the character of a comedy" (*WWRI*, 348). This "detail" is something that can only be viewed from a divine or noumenal perspective. We cannot gain the requisite distance from our suffering, unless we are to resign ourselves to it, to accept it as part of the will's universe, to embrace, in other words, our fate. And is not this solution to the tragic life actually in and of itself tragic? According to Schopenhauer's theory, we can never escape our suffering, only accept it as part of the universe's logic. As comic as life may seem from a distance, this is not a distance that we can ever attain.

> But the unfulfilled desires, the thwarted striving, the hopes that have been mercilessly crushed by fate, the fatal errors of the whole of life, with increased suffering and then death at the end, this always makes for tragedy. So as if fate wanted to add mockery to the misery of our existence, our lives have to contain all the grief of a tragedy, but we cannot even assert our dignity as tragic players; instead, in the expanse of life's details we cannot escape the roles of foolish, comic characters (*WWRI*, 348)

In other words, even the comic character of life itself is, truly, tragic. This duality of tragedy and comedy is something that Schopenhauer has in common with Shakespeare, and so it is no surprise that Schopenhauer's privileged metaphor should be that of stagecraft. As with Shakespeare, however, this metaphor is not merely figurative: life and art not only mirror one another but in fact embrace one and the same structure of existence. Schopenhauer's vision of man as either a tragic or a comic character is not an attempt to illustrate a point but is rather the point itself. His philosophy is intrinsically artistic (and above all literary) precisely because it is an understanding of life as fundamentally aesthetic: life itself is the form of the will to life, and thus can only be grasped formally. The fatalist ethics that Schopenhauer determines are, ultimately, a reflection of an acceptance that life itself is inescapably aesthetic: we are fated because we are formal. This is at the root of most classical interpretations of tragic art and it is for precisely this reason that Schopenhauer applies it to life.

Thus Schopenhauer's ethics really revolves around a formal appreciation of life itself, a kind of close reading of existence, an appreciation of existence for existence's sake, and an indulgence of formal qualities for their own sakes. Even his vision of tranquillity is reminiscent of an aesthete enjoying the technical qualities of an artwork: "life and its forms merely glide before him, like a fleeting appearance, like a gentle morning dream that floats by someone who is half awake, where reality is already shining through and cannot deceive anymore" (*WWRI*, 417). Indeed, does this passage not recall young Werther's notions as

quoted at the beginning of this piece? The important feature here is less the word "dream" than it is "forms" or the word "appearance". Who is it that we imagine lying in half-sleep, watching "life and its forms" passing over him? Surely it is the Romantic poet, the painter, the aesthete. This dream vision of reality, unable to deceive us further (which is to say, ultimate reality), is one of life for life's sake. We must cultivate our ethical stances towards the world in the same manner in which we appreciate art. Schopenhauer's sense of contentment is perfected in the moment when the aesthete casts his formal eye on existence as such, when the tragic hero learns to look on fate with a cold, analytical eye. This allows a substitution of aesthetic sincerity for moralising: "in *morality, good will* is everything; but in *art* it is nothing: there, as the word implies, only *ability* matters" (*WWRII*, 401). Is Schopenhauer ultimately endorsing amorality of the kind usually ascribed to aesthete caricatures? Not quite. Art, we must remember, detaches appearance from willing; in poetry we learn to view life as form, to appreciate it for its own sake, for its artistry. In other words, "the delight we feel in many of the songs in which *Goethe* brings the landscape before our eyes, or in *Jean Paul*'s portrayals of nature" lies in the "purity with which the world as representation had, in them, separated from the world as will and, as it were, entirely broken free from it" (*WWRII*, 397). We learn to look on the world formally and appreciate it artistically, resigning the painful process of willing. In Schopenhauer's tragic vision of existence, we have a model for how "art for art's sake" transforms into "life for life's sake", and how the aesthetic revolves around a fatalistic ethics.

Transcendent Fatalism: Schopenhauer's Literary Vision

We can see, then, that Schopenhauer collapses the distinction between understanding art and understanding life. Art, by mirroring the formal nature of life, allows us to see the createdness, the formal structures, and, in the case of our "fate", the narrative features of existence. In doing so, we can learn that the petty ambitions of our own lives are ultimately fruitless and meaningless, and that we are free to look on life as a dream vision or as a play upon a stage if we renounce ourselves. While this all sounds plausible in theory, in reality we do not renounce ourselves or our willing, and we continue to operate under the impression that we ourselves determine the facets of our own lives. We deny, in other words, what we call "fate". Schopenhauer remained keen after the publication of "The World as Will and Representation" to continue arguing for the fated-ness of mankind, and it is in his exposition of it that we see the true extent of the literariness of this concept.

In "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual", Schopenhauer distinguishes two different kinds of attitude that we take towards fate. First, simple or demonstrable fatalism. This is the belief that everything happens as a result of strict and blind necessity. In this regard, we may take demonstrable fatalism to be close to a deterministic view: everything that happens was always going to happen as it was determined by the concentric workings of forces long ago.[21] This kind of fatalism, Schopenhauer argues, takes the form of an *a priori* truth: we stand in an unreflective, purely factual relation to the network of forces which make up the events of our lives. This he opposes to what he calls "transcendent fatalism", which is the view that

> [the] necessity of all that happens is *not blind* and thus the belief in a connection of events in the course of our lives, as systematic as it is necessary, is a fatalism of a higher order which cannot, like simple fatalism, be demonstrated, but happens possibly to everyone sooner or later and firmly holds him either temporarily or permanently according to his way of thinking. (204).

This kind of fatalism is by its nature reflective, it is *a posteriori*, and it "gradually reveals itself from the experiences in the course of a man's life" (204). As opposed to demonstrable fatalism, in which we stand in a merely causal relation to fate, transcendent fatalism compromises a philosophical reflection on the course of one's life, lived, as Kierkegaard famously said, forwards but understood backwards. While he provides a definition of transcendent fatalism, Schopenhauer struggles in the essay to provide much in the way of example or concrete evidence. It is here that Schopenhauer has recourse to a series of literary metaphors. Fundamentally, transcendent fatalism amounts to "a conviction, that the course of an individual's life, however confused it appears to be, is a complete whole, in harmony with itself and having a definite tendency and didactic meaning, as profoundly conceived as is the finest epic" (204). The human subject becomes the ideal reader of their own story, becoming convinced that they stand in a relation to fate analogous to that of the relation between character and plotline in an epic: transcendent fatalism is thus a stance towards the universe in which the thinking subject understands itself as a figure or character whose movements are dictated or plotted elsewhere for some designed purpose or goal, and that this is all part of a harmonious whole.

Schopenhauer sustains the literary analogy across the whole of his essay. This kind of transcendent fatalism leads the individual subject to conceive of their own significance. There is, on the one hand, a detachment from the world, a figurative taking of a seat in the theatre: in this sense, the subject enters into a sublime observation, and the world "may sometimes be presented to him as if everything therein had been mapped out and the human beings appearing on the

[21] Schopenhauer (2000: 202). Subsequent textual references are to this edition.

scene seem to him to be mere performers in a play" (204). On the other hand, this sense of becoming can lead to the view that one is a protagonist and other human beings mere supporting characters, an overestimation of the significance of the individual thinking self. Furthermore, it can lead to a sense of discordance between life as we experience it – with its incidents of what seem to be random chance, wish fulfilment, desires and fears – and life as mapped out beyond us:

> Therefore there had to be some kind of provision for the realization of what is appropriate in this sense through a unity of the accidental and the necessary which lies at the very root of things. In virtue of that unity, the inner necessity showing itself as a kind of instinctive impulse, then rational deliberation, and finally the external operation of circumstances had to assist one another in the course of a man's life in such a way that, at the end thereof when it had been run through, they made it appear like a well-finished and perfected work of art, although previously, when it was still in the making, it had, as in the case of every planned work of art, the appearance of being often without plan or purpose. But whoever came along after its completion and closely considered it, would inevitably gaze in astonishment at such a course of life as the work of the most deliberate foresight, wisdom, and persistence. (207)

There is a natural tension between the intensity of life lived and the cold detachment we must take in order to understand our place in the universe. If everything we do is mapped out for us, it certainly does not feel like it is: at the very least, most human beings feel a sense of agency in everything they do, and our everyday encounters with what feels like the incidental strains against a sense of foresight and planning. It is only, Schopenhauer claims, at the end of life can we take the necessary stock of our lived existence and thus trace the patterns which emerge from the tale that we have told. Moreover, even if we cannot gain the necessary distance from our own lives in order to take a reader's perspective, our lives may appear to others as if perfectly designed. This is, for example, the difference between the observer of a painting and the figures painted within it: to the latter, as part of the artwork, they could never conceive of the "well-finished and perfected" whole as anything other than the duration of their lives.

It is difficult, then, in the course of our lives to gain the perspective required to understand ourselves in relation to the course of time. One reason for this is the inevitable mystery of the subject itself: were we mere figures in some transcendent fate, a divine plan analogous to a literary plot, then we would ourselves never know. Schopenhauer himself admits as much in his discussion of the relation between personal character and the events of his life, a quandary he frames in the following ways: first, "is a complete disparity possible between a man's character and fate?" Second, "looking at the main point, does the fate of everyone conform to his character?" (in which case it is hard to see how this would be fate at all), and third, "does a secret inconceivable necessity, comparable to the author of a drama, actually fit the two together always suitably?" "On

this very point", he admits, "we are in the dark" (207-208), and yet he nevertheless proposes a solution: character emerges only gradually over the course of life, it is revealed and realised in the reflective acts not only of the self but of others around us; fate, by contrast, provides the inevitable framework in which this character will be developed; it may be grasped by reflection but it cannot be determined or defined by it.

It is here and at other key points that Schopenhauer has most recourse to his literary metaphor, and it is worth pausing to demonstrate a few examples of them here. The totality of man's life compromises the unity of character and fate. This is a unity brought about by means of an invisible power, much like the thread which we imagine pulling together the sequences of the scenes of a play:

> Now such a power that runs through all things with an invisible thread would also have to combine those, which without any mutual connection are allowed by the causal chain, in such a way that they would come together at the required moment. Accordingly, it would be just as complete a master of the events of real life as is the poet of those of his drama (209)

This unifying power is, of course, the will to life which is, for Schopenhauer, both the animating force of all events in the universe and the essence of each individual; that it is to say, the will to life manifests itself both in the fate of an individual and in their character, and it is due to this dual character of the will that it is able to harmonise the subject with the course of its life, seeing as it is the causal root of both. This Schopenhauer further explains in terms which point forwards towards the Freudian interpretations which would become so influential a century later:

> just as everyone is the secret theatrical manager of his dreams, so too by analogy that fate that controls the actual course of our lives ultimately comes in some way from the *will*. This is our own and yet here, where it appears as fate, it operates from a region that lies far beyond our representing individual consciousness. (218-219)

A point which he later clarifies in terms both philosophical and literary:

> all the events in a man's life are connected in two fundamentally different ways; first in the objective causal connection of the course of nature, secondly in a subjective connection that exists only in reference to the individual who experiences them. It is as subjective as his own dreams, yet in him their succession and content are likewise necessarily determined, but in the manner in which the succession of the scenes of a drama is determined by the plan of the poet. (220)

In other words, the will is both form (fate) and content (character), unifying both. To extend his analogy, we may understand the relationship between man and "the course of nature" as one of character and plot, and the enveloping powers at work within and beyond them as one of author and artwork. The secret of life itself lies in the poet realising that he, his characters, his act of writing, are all fate themselves.

Schopenhauer frames fate as the "inexplicable union of the contingent with the necessary which manifests itself as the mysterious disposer of all things human" (210) and his use of literary analogy attempts to grasp a tangible series of relations by which we may better understand the nature of his investigation. What is it about the literary that lends itself so particularly to an analysis of the series of relations between humanity and fate? One answer is structural: on the one hand, the relations between author and text clearly mirror the conception of the relations between fate and the universe which Schopenhauer attempts to sketch; on the other hand, the formal relationships between character, plot, form, content, style, message, and meaning clearly mirror what he conceives of as the formal link between subject and universe. Another answer is conceptual: if the question of fate is "the mysterious disposer of all things human", then what greater repository of investigations has there been than the literary?

Conclusion

So, ultimately, what literature has always understood as fate, Schopenhauer demonstrates is the will to life. However, considered from the human perspective, we will always have recourse to our narrative understanding of existence, and so the ancient concept of fate and the Schopenhauerian notion of will enter into a conceptual marriage. We have been discussing the literary dimension of Schopenhauer's thought, and there are numerous accounts of the legacy of his philosophy in the literary world. What remains to be answered, however, is what the significance of Schopenhauer's literariness is for the relationship between literature and philosophy as a whole. In short, Schopenhauer's work constitutes the interrelation of the two categories: the literary and the philosophical stand in a dynamic relationship for Schopenhauer; the metaphysical and the aesthetic find their constant meeting point in his philosophy. The two works looked at, "The World as Will and Representation" and "Transcendent Speculation on the Apparent Deliberateness in the Fate of the Individual", demonstrate the extent to which metaphysics and literature interact. The argument outlined in both texts is not a metaphysical one illustrated by means of the literary, nor a literary embodiment of abstract metaphysical principles, but is rather a metaphysical principle (in this case, the will as fate, but one may speak of the will as a whole) which is best understood by means of the literary. At least in the case of the concept of fate, Schopenhauer reaches his metaphysical conclusions by means of thinking through literary categories and literary forms. He thus offers a model of a dynamic interrelation between literature and metaphysics: where in other cases one may speak of the ways in which a particular philosophy may have influenced the form and content of a poem, or the ways in which a particular author may have inspired the work of a philosopher, Schopenhauer allows

us to speak of the very literariness of existence itself. Furthermore, he offers a lasting answer to Plato and his conflict between literature and philosophy: as we see from Goethe, Shakespeare, and Byron, literature may become a way of doing philosophy. Schopenhauer does not think the literary though philosophical frameworks, but instead thinks philosophy through literary categories. This is, of course, not to claim that he does so exclusively, nor that he does so primarily, but that he does so profoundly and at key moments in his arguments. Whether we endorse Schopenhauer's philosophy is, in this regard, less significant than an endorsement of his commitment to an interrelation between literature and philosophy, particularly at a time of increasing mutual retreat between the disciplines. That he produced much of his argument from outside the academy should stand as an admonition to those within it.

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